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Abstract. In this paper we present a new model for the requirements analysis
of a system. We offer a conceptual model defined following a visual modeling
language, called dependence networks. TROPOS [9] uses dependence networks
in the requirements analysis, in this paper we propose to extend them with norms.
This improvement allows to define a new type of dependence networks, called
conditional dependence networks, representing a new modeling technique for the
requirements analysis of the system. Our model, moreover, allows the definition
of the notion of coalition depending on the different kinds of network. We present
our model using the scenario of virtual organizations based on a Grid network.
1 Introduction
The diffusion of software applications in the fields of e-Science and e-Research un-
derlines the necessity to develop open architectures, able to evolve and include new
software components. In the late years, the process of design of these software systems
became more complex. The definition of appropriate mechanisms of communication
and coordination between software components and human users motivates the devel-
opment of methods with the aim to support the designer for the whole development
process of the software, from the requirements analysis to the implementation.
The answer to this problem comes from software engineering that provided numer-
ous methods and methodologies allowing to treat more complex software systems. One
of these methodologies is the TROPOS methodology [9], developed for agent-oriented
design of software systems. The intuition of the TROPOS methodology [9] is to couple,
together with the instruments offered by software engineering, the multiagent paradigm.
In this paradigm, the entities composing the system are agent, autonomous by defini-
tion, characterized by their own sets of goals, capabilities and beliefs. TROPOS covers
five phases of the software development process: early requirements allowing the anal-
ysis and modeling of the requirements of the context in which the software system
will be inserted, late requirements describing the requirements of the software system,
architectural and detailed design of the system and, finally, the code implementation.
The TROPOS methodology [9] is based on the multiagent paradigm but it does not
consider the addition of a normative perspective to this paradigm. Since twenty years,
the design of artificial social systems is using mechanisms like social laws and norms
to control the behavior of multiagent systems [3]. These social concepts are used in the
conceptual modeling of multiagent systems, for example in requirements analysis, as
well as in formal analysis and agent based social simulation. For example, in the game
theoretic approach of Shoham and Tennenholtz [19], social laws are constraints on sets
of strategies. In this paper, we propose to add norms, presented thanks to the normative
multiagent paradigm, both to the requirements analysis phases and to the conceptual
meta-model. This paper addresses the following research question:
– How to apply a normative multiagent approach to the early and late requirements
analysis?
Our approach is based, following the approach of TROPOS [9], on a semiformal
language of visual modeling and it is composed by the following components. First,
as shown in the UML diagram of Figure 4, we present our ontology that defines the
set of concepts composing our conceptual metamodel. The elements composing the on-
tology are agents, goals, facts, skills, dependencies, coalitions with the addition of the
normative notions of roles, institutional goals, institutional facts, institutional skills, dy-
namic dependencies and obligations, sanctions, secondary obligations and conditional
dependencies. Second, our model is defined as a directed labeled graph whose nodes
are instances of the metaclasses of the metamodel, e.g., agents, goals, facts, and whose
arcs are instances of the metaclasses representing relationships between them such as
dependency, dynamic dependency, conditional dependency. Finally, we have a set of
rules and constraints to guide the building of the main concepts of the metamodel, e.g.
the formation of coalitions and their stability is constrained to the kind of dependen-
cies linking its members. In TROPOS [9], the requirements analysis is split in two main
phases, the early requirements and the late requirements. In our methodology, these two
phases share the same conceptual and methodological approach, thus we will refer to
them just as requirements analysis.
We introduce the normative issue of obligations, representing them directly in de-
pendence networks. This introduction allows the definition of a third kind of modeling
called conditional dependency modeling based on the structure of conditional depen-
dence networks. Conditional dependence networks represent obligations as particular
kinds of dependencies and these obligations are related to notions by means of sanc-
tions if the obligation is not fulfilled and contrary to duty when the primary obligation,
not fulfilled, actives a secondary obligation. Moreover, we introduce the notion of coali-
tion and we propose to use methods of social order such as obligations and sanctions
to efficiently achieve the maintenance of the stability and the cohesion of these groups.
Our model is intended to support the requirements specification for high level open
interaction system where heterogeneous and autonomous agents may interact.
Our model is not intended to support all analysis and design activities in software
development process, from application domain analysis down to the system implemen-
tation as in the TROPOS methodology [9], but only the requirements analysis phases
which involve dependence networks. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 de-
scribes a Grid computing scenario . In Section 3, we present the dependency and the
dynamic dependency modeling while in Section 4 we present a new kind of dependence
network, called conditional dependence network. Related work and conclusions end the
paper.
2 The Grid Scenario
The Grid Computing paradigm provides the technological infrastructure to facilitate
e-Science and e-Research. Grid technologies can support a wide range of research in-
cluding amongst others: seamless access to a range of computational resources and
linkage of a wide range of data resources. It is often the case that research domains and
resource providers require more information than simply the identity of the individual
in order to grant access to use their resources. The same individual can be in multiple
collaborative projects, each of which is based upon a common shared infrastructure.
This information is typically established through the concept of a virtual organization
(VO) [14]. A virtual organization allows the users, their roles and the resources they can
access in a collaborative project to be defined. In the context of virtual organizations,
there are numerous technologies and standards that have been put forward for defining
and enforcing authorization policies for access to and usage of virtual organizations re-
sources. Role based access control (RBAC) is one of the more well established models
for describing such policies. In the RBAC model, virtual organization specific roles are
assigned to individuals as part of their membership of a particular virtual organization.
As presented by Zhao et al. [25], obligations are requirements and tasks to be ful-
filled, which can be augmented into conventional systems to allow extras information
to be specified when responding to authorization requests. For example in [25], admin-
istrators can associate obligations with permissions, and require the fulfillment of the
obligations when the permissions are exercised. The general idea of the RBAC model
is that, permissions are associated with functional roles in organizations, and members
of the roles acquire all permissions associated with the roles. Allocation of permission
to users is achieved by assigning roles to users. Failure of the fulfilling an obligation
will incur a sanction.
Some of the main features of a node in a Grid are reliability, degree of accepted
requests, computational capabilities, degree of faults and degree of trust for confiden-
tial data. These different features set up important differences among the nodes and the
possible kinds of coalitions that can be formed and maintained. Reciprocity-based coali-
tions can be viewed as a sort of virtual organizations in which there is the constraint that
each node has to contribute something, and has to get something out of it. The scenario
of virtual organizations based on Grid networks represents a case study able to under-
line the benefits of a normative multiagent paradigm for requirements analysis. First of
all, in the normative multiagent paradigm as well as in the common multiagent one, the
autonomy of agents is the fixed point of all representations, i.e., the Grid philosophy
imposes the autonomy of the nodes composing it. Second, the normative multiagent
paradigm allows a clear definition of the notion of role and its associated permissions,
i.e. the role based access control policy needs a design able to assign roles and repre-
sents to all the consequent constraints based on them. Third, the normative multiagent
paradigm allows the introduction at requirements analysis level of obligations able to
model the system. Fourth, the concept of coalition and the constraints introduced by
this concept can model the concept of ”local network“ in virtual organizations. Finally,
the presented modeling activities depict the system using structures similar to the Grid
network itself.
3 Dependency and Dynamic Dependency Modeling
Figure 1 shows the ontology on which is based our model containing a number of
concepts related to each other. We divide our ontology in three submodels: the agent
model, the institutional model, and the role assignment model, as shown in Figure 1.
Roughly, the institutional model represents sets of agents regulated by social norms.
For more details, see [4]. The Figure depicts, following the legend of Figure 2, the three
submodels which group the concepts of our ontology.
Fig. 1. The conceptual metamodel.
Such a decomposition is common in organizational theory, because an organization
can be designed without having to take into account the agents that will play a role
in it. Also, if another agent starts to play a role, for example if a node with the role of
simple user becomes a VO administrator, then this remains transparent for the organiza-
tional model. Likewise, agents can be developed without knowing in advance in which
institution they will play a role.
As shown in Figure 1, we add to the notions of agent, goal and capability compos-
ing the agent view, those related to the institutional view such as the notion of role and
all its institutional goals, capabilities and facts. These notions are unified in the com-
bined view and to each agent it is possible to assign different roles depending on the
organization in which the agent is playing. In this way, early and late requirements can
be based both on agents and on roles. Models are acquired as instances of a conceptual
metamodel resting on the concepts presented in the following sections. For more details
on the three conceptual submodels, see Boella et al. [5] and Boella et al. [4].
3.1 Dependency Modeling
Figure 2 shows the components of our model. Our model is a directed labeled graph
whose nodes are instances of the metaclasses of the metamodel, e.g., agents, goals,
facts, and whose arcs are instances of the metaclasses representing relationships be-
tween them such as dependency, dynamic dependency, conditional dependency.
Dependence networks [20] represent our first modeling activity consisting in the
identification of the dependencies among agents and among roles. In the early require-
ments phase, we represent the domain stakeholders using these networks while in the
late requirements phase, the same kind of approach is followed representing the agents
of the future system involved in the dependence network. Figure 2-(a) shows the graph-
ical representation of the model obtained following this modeling activity, the depen-
dency modeling. The legend describes the agents (depicted as white circles), the roles
(depicted as black circles), the agents assigned to roles (depicted as grey circles), the
agents’/roles’ goals (depicted as white rectangles) and the dependency among agents
(one arrowed line connecting two agents with the addition of a label which represents
the goal on which there is the dependency). The legend considers dependencies among
agents but they can be also among roles or agents assigned to roles.
Fig. 2. Legend of the graphical representation of our model.
3.2 Dynamic Dependence Networks
Dynamic dependence networks have been firstly introduced by Caire et al. [11] and
then treated in Boella et al. [5] in which the existence of a dependency depends on the
actions of the agents which can delete it. Here, as shown in Figure 2-(a), we distinguish
“negative” dynamic dependencies where a dependency exists unless it is removed by
a set of agents due to removal of a goal or ability of an agent, and “positive” dynamic
dependencies where a dependency may be added due to the power of a third set of
agents. Dynamic dependency modeling represents our second modeling activity for re-
quirements analysis. A formal definition of dynamic dependence networks is given in
Boella et al. [4].
The legend of Figure 2-(a) describes the sign of the dynamic dependency (depicted
as a black square) and the dynamic dependency among agents (depicted as one arrowed
line connecting two agents with the addition of a label which represents the goal on
which there is the dependency and another arrowed dotted line with the sign’s label
connecting an agent to the arrowed plain line that can be deleted or added by this agent).
Figure 3 presents an example of dynamic dependence network on the Grid.
Fig. 3. An example of dynamic dependence network.
A coalition can be defined in dependence networks, based on the idea that to be part
of a coalition, every agent has to contribute something and has to get something out of
it. The graphical representation of coalitions is depicted in Figure 2-(b) which describes
coalitions (depicted as sets of agents and dependencies included in a dotted circle) and
vulnerable and potential coalitions (depicted as sets of agents and dependencies in a
circle in which one or more of these dependencies can be added or deleted by another
agent with a labeled dynamic dependency). Definition 1 makes a distinction between
coalitions which are actually formed, vulnerable coalitions which can be destroyed by
the deletion of dynamic dependencies and, potential coalitions, which can be formed
depending on additions and deletions of dynamic dependencies.
Definition 1 (Coalition). Let A be a set of agents and G be a set of goals. A coalition
function is a partial function C : A → 2A × 2G such that {a | C(a,B,G)} = {b |
b ∈ B,C(a,B,G)}, the set of agents profiting from the coalition is the set of agents
contributing to it. Let 〈A,G, dyndep−, dyndep+,≥〉 be a dynamic dependence network,
and dep the associated static dependencies.
1. A coalition function C is a coalition if ∃a ∈ A,B ⊆ A,G′ ⊆ G such that
C(a,B,G′) implies G′ ∈ dep(a,B). Coalitions which cannot be destroyed by
addition or deletion of dependencies by agents in other coalitions.
2. A coalition function C is a vulnerable coalition if it is not a coalition and ∃a ∈
A,D,B ⊆ A,G′ ⊆ G such that C(a,B,G′) implies G′ ∈ ∪Ddyndep−(a,B,D).
Coalitions which do not need new goals or abilities, but whose existence can be
destroyed by removing dependencies.
3. A coalition function C is a potential coalition if it is not a coalition or a vulner-
able coalition and ∃a ∈ A,D,B ⊆ A,G′ ⊆ G such that C(a,B,G′) implies
G′ ∈ ∪D(dyndep−(a,B,D) ∪ G′ ∈ dyndep+(a,B,D)) Coalitions which could
be created or which could evolve if new abilities or goals would be created by
agents of other coalitions on which they dynamically depend.
Figure 3 presents two different coalitions. On the one hand, we have the a real
coalition composed by agents n1, n2 and n3. On the other hand, we have a potential
coalition, such as a coalition which could be formed if agent n6 really performs the
dynamic addition, making agent n5 dependent on agent n4.
4 Conditional Dependency Modeling
In this section, we answer to the question how to introduce obligations in dependence
networks by defining the conditional dependency modeling. Normative multiagent sys-
tems are “sets of agents (human or artificial) whose interactions can fruitfully be re-
garded as norm-governed; the norms prescribe how the agents ideally should and should
not behave. [...] Importantly, the norms allow for the possibility that actual behavior may
at times deviate from the ideal, i.e., that violations of obligations, or of agents’ rights,
may occur” [6]. The notion of conditional obligation with an associated sanction is the
base of the so called regulative norms. Obligations are defined in terms of goals of the
agent and both the recognition of the violation and the application of the sanctions are
the result of autonomous decisions of the agent.
A well-known problem in the study of deontic logic is the representation of contrary-
to-duty structures, situations in which there is a primary obligation and what we might
call a secondary obligation, coming into effect when the primary one is violated [18]. A
natural effect coming from contrary-to-duty obligations is that obligations pertaining to
a particular point in time cease to hold after they have been violated since this violation
makes every possible evolution in which the obligation is fulfilled inaccessible. A clas-
sical example of contrary-to-duty obligations is given by the so called “gentle murder”
by Forrester [13] which says “do not kill, but if you kill, kill gently”.
The introduction of norms in dependence networks is based on the necessity to
adapt the requirements analysis phases to model norm-based systems. An example of
application of this kind consists in the introduction of obligations in virtual Grid-based
organizations [25] where obligations, as shown in Section 2, are used to enforce the
authorization decisions. On the one hand, in approaches like [25], obligations are con-
sidered simply as tasks that have to be fulfilled when an authorization is accepted/denied
while, on the other hand, in approaches like [17], the failure in fulfilling the obligation
incurs a sanction but there is no secondary obligation.
The introduction of obligations brings us to introduce a new kind of goal, the nor-
mative one. These goals originate from norms and they represent the obligation itself.
We define a new set of normative concepts, based on Boella et al. [2] model of obli-
gations, and we group them in a new view, called the normative view. The normative
view is composed by a set of norms N and three main functions, oblig, sanct and ctd
representing obligation, sanctions and contrary-to-duty obligations. The UML diagram
of Figure 4 provides a unified vision of the presented concepts of the ontology repre-
senting our conceptual metamodel.
Definition 2 (Normative View). Let the agent view 〈A,F,G,X, goals : A → 2G, skills :
A → 2X , rules1 : 2X → 2G〉 and the institutional view 〈RL, IF,RG,X, igoals :
RL → 2RG, iskills : RL → 2X , irules : 2X → 2IF 〉, the normative view is a tuple
〈A,G,RG,N, oblig, sanct, ctd〉 where:
– A is a set of agents, G is a set of goals, RG is a set of institutional goals;
– N is a set of norms;
1
rules and irules associate sets of (institutional) actions with the sets of (institutional) facts to
which they lead.
Fig. 4. The UML class diagram specifying the main concepts of the metamodel.
– the function oblig : N ×A → 2G∪RG is a function that associates with each norm
and agent, the goals and institutional goals the agent must achieve to fulfill the
norm. Assumption: ∀n ∈ N and a ∈ A, oblig(n, a) ∈ power({a})2.
– the function sanct : N × A → 2G∪RG is a function that associates with each
norm and agent, the goals and institutional goals that will not be achieved if the
norm is violated by agent a. Assumption: for each B ⊆ A and H ∈ power(B) that
(∪a∈Asanct(n, a)) ∩H = ∅.
– the function ctd : N×A → 2G∪RG is a function that associates with each norm and
agent, the goals and institutional goals that will become the new goals the agent
a has to achieve if the norm is violated by a. Assumption:∀n ∈ N and a ∈ A,
ctd(n, a) ∈ power({a}).
We relate norms to goals following a twofold direction. First, we associate with
each norm n a set of goals and institutional goals oblig(n) ⊆ G ∪ RG. Achieving
these normative goals means that the norm n has been fulfilled; not achieving these
goals means that the norm is violated. We assume that every normative goal can be
achieved by the group, i.e., the group has the power to achieve it. Second, we associate
with each norm a set of goals and institutional goals sanct(n) ⊆ G ∪ RG which will
not be achieved if the norm is violated and it represents the sanction associated with
the norm. We assume that the group of agents does not have the power to achieve
these goals. Third, we associate with each norm (primary obligation) another norm
(secondary obligation) represented by a set of goals and institutional goals ctd(n) ⊆
G ∪RG that have to be fulfilled if the primary obligation is violated.
2 Power relates each agent with the goals it can achieve.
Our aim is not to present an new theorem that, using norms semantics, checks
whether a given interaction protocol complies with norms. We are more interested in
considering, in the context of requirements analysis, how agents’ behaviour is effected
by norms and in analyzing how to constrain the modeling of coalitions’ evolution thanks
to a normative system. There are two main assumptions in our approach. First of all we
assume that norms can sometimes be violated by agents in order to keep their autonomy.
The violation of norms is handled by means of sanctions and contrary to duty mecha-
nisms. Second, we assume that, from the institutional perspective, the internal state of
the external agents is neither observable nor controllable but the institutional state or
public state of these agents is note since connected to a role and it can be changed by
the other agents.
We define a new modeling activity, called conditional dependency modeling, to sup-
port in the early and late requirements analysis the representation of obligations, sanc-
tions and contrary-to-duty obligations. Conditional dependence networks are defined as
follows:
Definition 3 (Conditional Dependence Networks (CDN)).
A conditional dependence network is a tuple 〈A,G, cdep, odep, sandep, ctddep〉 where:
– A is a set of agents and G is a set of goals;
– cdep : 2A × 2A → 22G is a function that relates with each pair of sets of agents all
the sets of goals on which the first depends on the second.
– odep : 2A × 2A → 22G is a function representing a obligation-based dependency
that relates with each pair of sets of agents all the sets of goals on which the first
depends on the second.
– sandep ⊆ (OBL ⊆ (2A × 2A × 22G)) × (SANCT ⊆ (2A × 2A × 22G)) is a
function relating obligations to the dependencies which represent their sanctions.
Assumption: SANCT ∈ cdep and OBL ∈ odep.
– ctddep ⊆ (OBL1 ⊆ (2A × 2A × 22
G
)) × (OBL2 ⊆ (2
A × 2A × 22
G
)) is a
function relating obligations to the dependencies which represent their secondary
obligations. Assumption: OBL1, OBL2 ∈ odep and OBL1 ∩OBL2 = ∅.
Fig. 5. Legend of the graphical representation of the conditional dependency modeling.
Figure 5 gives a graphical representation of the conditional dependency modeling.
It describes the obligation-based dependency (depicted as a striped arrowed line), the
obligation-based dependency with the associated sanction expressed as conditional de-
pendency (depicted as a striped arrowed line representing the obligation connected to
a common arrowed line representing the sanction by a striped line) and the obligation-
based dependency with the associated secondary obligation (depicted as a striped ar-
rowed line representing the primary obligation connected to another striped arrowed
line representing the secondary obligation by a striped line). The two functions ctddep
and sandep are graphically represented as the striped line connecting the obligation to
the sanction or to the secondary obligation.
Example 1. Considering Grid’s nodes of Figure 3, we can think to add two constraints
under the form of obligations and we build the following conditional dependence net-
work CDN = 〈A,G, cdep, odep, sandep, ctddep〉:
1. Agents A = {n1, n2, n3, n4, n5, n6};
2. Goals G = {g1, g2, g3, g4, g5, g6, g7, g8};
3. cdep({n1}, {n2}) = {{g1}}: agent n1 depends on agent n2 to achieve the goal
{g1}: to save the file comp.log;
dep({n2}, {n3}) = {{g2}}: agent n2 depends on agent n3 to achieve the goal
{g2}: to run the file mining.mat ;
dep({n3}, {n1}) = {{g5}}: agent n3 depends on agent n1 to achieve the goal
{g5}: to save the file satellite.jpg;
dep({n4}, {n6}) = {{g3}}: agent n4 depends on agent n6 to achieve the goal
{g3}: to run the file results.mat ;
dep({n6}, {n5}) = {{g4}}: agent n6 depends on agent n5 to achieve the goal
{g4}: to save the file satellite.mpeg;
dep({n5}, {n4}) = {{g6}}: agent n5 depends on agent n4 to achieve the goal
{g6}: to have the authorization to open the file dataJune.mat ;
odep({n2}, {n1}) = {{g7}}: agent n2 is obliged to perform goal {g7} concerning
agent n1 : to run the file mining.mat with the highest priority;
odep({n4}, {n5}) = {{g8}}: agent n4 is obliged to perform goal {g8} concerning
agent n5 : to share results of the running of file dataJune.mat with agent n5;
odep({n4}, {n6}) = {{g8}}: agent n4 is obliged to perform goal {g8} concerning
agent n6 : to share results of the running of file dataJune.mat with agent n6;
sandep{(({n2}, {n1}) = {{g7}}, ({n1}, {n2}) = {{g1}})};
ctddep{(({n4}, {n5}) = {{g8}}, ({n4}, {n6}) = {{g8}})};
Example 1 is depicted in Figure 6 which shows the network in the step after the
deletion and the insertion of the two dynamic dependencies of Figure 3. In Figure 6,
following the definition of coalition, we have two coalitions composing, e.g., two local
groups of a virtual organization. The first one is composed by nodes n1, n2, n3 and
the other one is composed by nodes n4, n5 and n6. Since these two subsets of the
virtual organization have to work with a good cohesion then it is possible to insert some
constraints, made clear by obligations. The first obligation consists in giving the highest
priority to, for example, a computation for an agent composing the same local coalition
as you. This first obligation is related to a sanction if it is violated. This link is made
Fig. 6. Conditional Dependence Network of Example 1.
clear by the function sandep and it represents the deletion of a dependency concerning
a goal of the agent that has to fulfill the obligation. The second obligation, instead, is
related to a secondary obligation and it means that the agent has to share the results of a
computation with a member of its coalition but, if it does not fulfill this obligation then
it has to share these results with another member of its coalition.
Figure 7 shows the graphical representation of how an obligation in a conditional
dependence network can evolve toward the application of a sanction or of a secondary
obligation. In the first case, if the obligation is fulfilled and it is linked to a sanction then
the obligation can be removed and also the connection among the obligation and the
sanction can be removed. The only dependency that remains in the network is the one
related to the sanction that passes from being a conditional dependency to a common
dependency. If the obligation is not fulfilled then it is deleted and the deletion involves
also the conditional dependency representing the sanction. The sanction consists exactly
the deletion of this conditional dependency associated to a goal that the agent would
achieve. In the second case, if the obligation is fulfilled and it is linked to a secondary
obligation then the obligation is deleted and also the secondary obligation is deleted
since there is no reason to already exists. If the obligation, instead, is not fulfilled then
the primary obligation is deleted but the secondary obligation not. Note that in Figure 7
are depicted only the conditional dependencies and the obligational dependencies and
not all the other kinds of possible dependencies present in the network.
Summarizing, we represent obligations, sanctions and contrary-to-duty obligations
as tuples of dependencies related to each other. An obligation is viewed as a particular
kind of dependency and it is related to dependencies due to sanctions and dependencies
due to secondary obligations. In the first case, we have that sanctions are common
dependencies, already existing inside the system that, because of their connection with
the obligation, can be deleted. These obligations can be of different kinds depending
on the involved agents. For example, we can have a primary obligation linked to two
secondary obligations: a first case con involve the same agents, e.g., agent a has to pay
agent b for a service but he does not do the payment thus the secondary obligation is to
pay to agent b an additional cost, and second case can involve a third agent, e.g., agent
a continues to not pay you thus a third agent c is obliged to punish it for example with
the deletion of all the services he has to perform for this agent.
Fig. 7. The evolution of conditional dependence networks.
4.1 Two case studies: personal norms and transactions.
In the real life, everybody’s life is regulated by personal norms like not kill and not
leave trash on the roads. These norms are referred to every person and it seems that
everyone depends on the others to achieve these goals that can be represented as goals
of the whole society. It is similar to the social delegation cycle: do not do the others
what you do not want them to do to you. In this case, we can represent the dependence
network as a full connected graph since every agent depends on all the other agents,
for example to not be killed. This case study makes explicit the necessity to simplify
the dependence network with the aim to individuate the obligations. The simplification
brought by the representation of obligations is relevant, as can be seen in Figure 8-(a).
Fig. 8. Case studies: personal norms and transactions.
The second case study consists in transactions. A transaction is an agreement or
communication carried out between separate entities, often involving the exchange of
items of value, such as information, goods, services and money. This is the basic idea
underlying norm emergence. Let us consider the case of two agents a and b, where a is
a buyer and b is a seller. If we consider two goals such as g1: book sent by the seller b to
buyer a and g2: money transferred from the buyer a to the seller b, we have the depen-
dence network depicted in Figure 8-(b). The two agents depend on each other to achieve
their goals, the seller is waiting for its payment and the buyer is waiting for its good.
When introduced, our representation of obligations allows to obtain a simplified ver-
sion of the network in which each agent depends on itself to not violate the obligation.
The dependence network derived after the norm creation is much more simpler than the
previous one representing however the same concepts. This simplified version can be
used for the requirements analysis phase of the multiagent system allowing to individ-
uate in a simpler way the obligations present inside the system, without the necessity to
analyze all the goal-based dependencies present in the network.
4.2 Coalitions in Conditional Dependence Networks
In this section, we answer to the question: what kind of constraints are set by obli-
gations in conditional dependence networks concerning coalitions. In Section 3, we
presented a definition of coalition based on the structure of dynamic dependence net-
works. In these dynamic coalitions we deal with conditional goals but there is not the
presence of obligations intended as sets of dependencies linked together by a relation
of the kind obligation-sanction or primary obligation-secondary obligation. Conditional
dependence networks have to be taken into account when a system is described in terms
of coalitions, vulnerable coalitions and potential coalitions since they can change de-
pending on the conditional dependencies set by obligations. A coalition has to consider
sanctions and secondary obligations, according to these constraints:
Definition 4 (Constraints for Coalitions in Conditional Dependence Networks).
Let A be a set of agents and G be a set of goals. A coalition function is a partial
function C ⊆ A× 2A × 2G such that {a | C(a,B,G)} = {b | b ∈ B,C(a,B,G)}, the
set of agents profiting from the coalition is the set of agents contributing to it.
Introducing conditional dependence networks, the following constraints arise:
– ∀(dep1, dep2) ∈ sandep, dep2 /∈ C if and only if dep1 /∈ C. If the obligation,
associated to the dependency dep1 is not part of the coalition C then also the
sanction dep2 associated to the obligation is not part of the coalition C. If the
obligation, associated to the dependency dep1 is part of the coalition C then also
the sanction dep2 associated to the obligation is part of the coalition C.
– ∀(dep1, dep2) ∈ ctddep, dep2 ∈ C if and only if dep1 /∈ C. If the primary obli-
gation, associated to the dependency dep1 is not part of the coalition C then the
secondary obligation dep2 is part of the coalition C. If the primary obligation,
associated to the dependency dep1 is part of the coalition C then the secondary
obligation dep2 is not part of the coalition C.
Example 2. Let us consider conditional dependence network of Example 1, depicted
in Figure 6. Applying these constraints, we have that if the obligation on goal g7 is
fulfilled then the coalition composed by agents n1, n2 and n3 already exists since the
dependency associated to the sanction is not deleted. If the obligation on goal g7 is not
fulfilled then the obligation is deleted but also the sanction is deleted and the coalition
does not exist any more. Concerning the second coalition, if the obligation on goal g8
is fulfilled then both the primary and the secondary obligation are removed but if the
primary obligation is not fulfilled then the secondary obligation is part of the coalition
composed by agents n4, n5 and n6.
5 Related work
The idea of focusing the activities that precede the specification of software require-
ments, in order to understand how the intended system will meet organizational goals,
is not new. It has been first proposed in requirements engineering, specifically in Eric
Yu’s work with his i* model [24]. The rationale of the i* model is that by doing an
earlier analysis, one can capture not only the what or the how, but also the why a piece
of software is developed. As stated throughout the paper, the most important inspiration
source for our model is the TROPOS methodology [9] that spans the overall software
development process, from early requirements to implementation. Other approaches to
software engineering are those of KAOS [12], GAIA [23], AAII [16] and MaSE [15]
and AUML [1]. The comparison of these works is summarized in Figure 9.
Fig. 9. Comparison among different software engineering methodologies.
The main difference between these approaches and our one consists in the use at the
same time of the normative multiagent paradigm based on both the notion of institution
and the notion of obligation with its related concepts of contrary-to-duty and sanction
and of graphical modeling language based on dependencies among agents. Moreover,
these approaches do not consider the notion of coalition, as group of actors with a
common set of goals and the possible constraints on their structure.
An example of normative multiagent system introducing obligations has been done
by Boella and van der Torre [7]. Interesting approaches on the application of the notion
of institution to multiagent systems are defined in Sierra et al. [21], Bogdanovych et al.
[8] and Vazquez-Salceda et al. [22].
6 Conclusions
This paper provides a detailed account of a new requirements analysis model based
on the normative multiagent paradigm, following the TROPOS methodology [9]. The
paper presents and discusses the early and late requirements phases of systems design.
The first part of the paper presents the key concepts of the ontology of our methodology
as shown by the UML diagram of Figure 4. The second part of the paper presents the
graphical representations of the three modeling activities by which our model is com-
posed. These modeling activities are called dependency modeling, dynamic dependency
modeling and conditional dependency modeling. The addition of normative concepts is
a relevant improvement to requirements analysis since it allows, first, to constrain the
construction of the requirements modeling and, second, to represent systems, as for
example Grid-based systems, in which there are explicit obligations regulating the be-
haviour of the components composing it. Moreover, we model the requirements analysis
phases also in a context in which there is the possible presence of coalitions.
Of course, this model is not intended for any type of software. For system software,
e.g., a compiler, or embedded software, the operating environment of the system-to-be
is an engineering artifact, with no identifiable stakeholders. In such cases, traditional
software development techniques may be most appropriate. However, a large and grow-
ing percentage of software operates within open, dynamic organizational environments.
Concerning future work, we are concentrating our efforts on the definition of the
notion of coalitions’ stability in this model. We are interested in representing the coali-
tions’ evolution process by means of our modeling techniques and in defining more
powerful constraints on coalitions with the aim to maintain, thanks to the application
of norms, coalitions’ stability during this evolution process. In our opinion, this would
be a relevant improvement to the studies concerning coalitions’ stability because of
the application, at the same time, of a social network approach, providing measures and
graph-based methods, and a normative multiagent approach, providing mechanisms like
social laws and norms. Moreover, we aim in addressing an evaluation analysis to specify
the consistency of a system defined by means of our modeling techniques. Finally, we
are improving our conditional dependency modeling by adding also the representation
of prohibitions.
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